THE JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL COURTS
IN LABOR DISPUTES
RAY FoRmssn*

I
The jurisdiction of the federal courts in labor disputes furnishes an interesting
opportunity for study of the role to which the courts are assigned by Congress in the
handling of a specific national problem. In this case, of course, the problem is an
unusually difficult and troublesome one. This jurisdiction is of further interest as a
case study of the consistency of present-day practices with original constitutional intent concerning, and the historical development of, the role of the federal judiciary
in the national scene. State and federal relations are, of course, in issue.
Emotion, expediency, legislative improvisation, political maneuvering, conflicting
economic forces, governmental planning, and the role of the federal judiciary in such
planning are all involved in this laboratory specimen of the federal judiciary in
action.
Current legislation is of special interest in this connection.
II
For many years the policy of the national government was directed toward removing the federal judicial system as a restraining influence on trade-union activity.
The policy was specifically expressed in 1914 when Congress declared that "nothing
contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to... forbid or restrain individual
members of [labor] organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects
thereof; .. -" It was reaffirmed in 1932 with the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, restricting the jurisdiction of federal courts in the issuance of injunctions in
labor cases.
This policy was followed, in general, by state governments as well.
Parallel with this development, both the state and the federal governments evidenced increasing willingness to refer labor disputes to special boards and agencies,
such as the National Labor Relations Board and comparable state boards and commissions. While the National Labor Relations Board was granted jurisdiction designed to strengthen labor unions, it was not unusual for state agencies to exercise
restraining power as well?
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47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.

S. C. SIoX (1940).

*Wisconsin, a pioneer in labor legislation, enacted such a law in the Wisconsin Employment Peace
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This inclination to remove the courts as agencies for the regulation of union
activity was justified by its exponents on several grounds. It was said that the
judges were inclined to be overly generous in the use of the injunction in labor
disputes. Labor consistently expressed a far greater fear of trial by judges than trial
by battle; and with the growth of government sympathetic to labor, management
has assumed corresponding apprehensions. Proposals for compulsory arbitration as
a panacea for disastrous labor-management stalemates have consistently fallen, by
mutual consent, before the eternal problem of finding the impartial arbitrator in the
judicial system or elsewhere.
Opponents of judicial control contended, also, that the problems of labor and
management were sui generis in the judicial sense, calling for judgments of policy
and determinations of problems outside the experience and training of the average
judge and beyond the customary boundaries of the judicial function. There was,
in part, a suggestion that labor questions were political questions and therefore subject to political rather than judicial determination. And there was, in part,
the growing prestige of expertise in the determination of special or technical problems, whereby jurisdiction was taken from the judicial jack-of-all-problems and given
to the judicial specialist-with the name of commissioner or administrator. Furthermore, the constant fear of over-burdening the federal judiciary with the multiplying problems of a complex and growing society made itself felt.
It is interesting to note, however, that in the same period Congress, particularly
on one occasion, indicated willingness to grant broad jurisdiction to the federal courts
in aid of labor. In the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 it is provided that an employee may sue to recover unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation
"inany court of competent jurisdiction .

.

."' This provision is read by the courts

in conjunction with Section 41(8) of the Judicial Code to give the federal courts
broad jurisdiction in such cases.7 A reference will be made later to the validity of
this jurisdiction.
During the period which may be broadly described as that of World War II,
Congress underwent a gradual but definite shift in its approach to labor and management relations. Turing from a program designed to favor and bolster thegrowth of trade unions, it indicated in one legislative enactment and then another'
See the comments in this regard in the minority report from the Committee on Education and
Labor on the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947. H. R. RaP. No. 245, 8oth Cong., ist Sess. 102
(1947).
' 52 STAT. xo69 (1938), 29 U. S. C. S216(b)
£

(1940).

This subsection provides that the federal district courts shall have original jurisdiction "of all suits

and proceedings arising under any law regulating commerce." 36 STAT. 1092 (1911), 38 STAT. 29
(1913), 28 U. S. C. §4I(8) (1940).
The use of the words "arising under" herein should be noted
with reference to the discussion which is to follow.

"Williams v. Terminal Co., 315 U. S. 386, 390 (1942); Fleming v. Wood-Fruitticher Grocery Co.,
37 F. Supp. 947, 948 (941); Robertson v. Argu Hosiery Mills, 32 F. Supp. ig, 20 (x940).
'For examples, see War Labor Disputes Act, 57 STAT. x63 (1943), 50 U. S. C. App. 5s5O-1suz
(Supp. 1946); Lea Act, 48 STAT. xO64 (1934), as amended, 6o STAT. 89, 47 U. S. C. A. 55o6 (Supp.
1946).
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a change in fundamental sympathy, until finally it became evident to even the most
casual observer that Congress had shifted its fear from the danger of a strong management force oppressive of labor to a fear of union organization which it considered
strong enough to constitute a threat to the public welfare.
This new congressional attitude attained its fullest expression in the Eightieth
Congress. In June of 1947 the Taft-Hartley Act was passed.10 While it retained
the provisions of the Wagner Act protecting the organization of trade unions, it
established new rules and procedures designed to protect management and regulate
labor. Of most significance in relation to this discussion, it broadened the participation of the federal judiciary in labor matters by providing not only for jurisdiction in
aid of labor, as in the past, but also for jurisdiction over some provisions of the Act
designed to restrict and police labor.
III
,The enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act may well mark the beginning of a new
role for the federal courts in the field of labor-management relations-a role for
which they were earlier considered unsuited.
Particularly noteworthy in this regard are the provisions of Section 301 of Tide
III of the Act.
This section provides that in suits for violation of labor contracts, the jurisdiction
of the subject matter in the federal courts may be predicated upon the fact that the
case involves "an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an
industry affecting commerce."'"
The evident breadth of this grant of jurisdiction has already evoked challenges of
its constitutionality from several sources.' 2
The section further seeks to widen the doors of the federal courts by its generous
provisions concerning jurisdictional amount,'3 venue, 14 service of process,' 3 and
agency.' 6 Provisions in other portions of the Act also serve to increase the powers
of the federal courts in the regulation of labor.'
The purpose of Congress in establishing this new role for the federal judiciary in

*It
is, of course, not the purpose of this paper
1029 U. S. C. A. §1.5 (Supp. 1947). Senate

to consider whether this position was justified or not.
bill, S. 1126; House bill,
H. R; 3020.

1
"5 Section 30(2), 29 U. S. C. A. §i85(a) (Supp. 1947).

" Minority Report of the Committee on Education and Labor on the Labor Management Relations
Act, 3947. H. R. REP. No. 245, 8oth Cong., sst Sess. sog-iso (1947). Olverson, Collectike Bar.
gaining and the Taft-Hartley Labor Act, 33 VA. L. REv. 549, 577 (1947); Hearings before the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on S. 55 and S. I. Res. 22, Pt. a, 8oth Cong., xstSess. 56, 57
(947); Minority Views of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, SEN. REP. No. 1o5, Pt. 2,
8oth Cong., ist Sess. 14 (1947).
" Section 301(a), cited supra note ii.
'! Section 30(c), 29 U. S. C. A. §r85(c)

(Supp. 1947).

"5 Section 3o(d), 29 U. S. C. A. §S8!(d) (Supp. 1947).
"Section 301(e), 29 U. S. C. A. §S85(e) (Supp. 1947).

"7On this
see Notes, The Taft-Hartley Act, 96 U. oF PA. L. REv. 67 et seq. (1947); Comment,The
Labor-Management Relation! Act of 1947, 42 ILL. L. REV. 444 (1947);
Relations under the Taft.Hartley Act, 25 H~Av. Bus. REv. 554 (1947).
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labor matters is best indicated by the statements of the members of Congress directly
involved in the passage of the law.
The report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare says:
In the judgment of the committee, breaches of collective agreement have become so
numerous that it is not sufficient to allow the parties to invoke the processes of the National Labor Relations Board when such breaches occur (as the bill proposes to do in title I).
We feel that the aggrieved party should also have a right of action in the Federal
courts....

The laws of many States make it difficult to sue effectively and to recover a judgment
against an unincorporated labor union. It is difficult to reach the funds of a union to
satisfy a judgment against it. In some States it is necessary to serve all the members
before an action can be maintained against the union. This is an almost impossible
process....

If unions can break agreements with relative impunity then such agreements do not
tend to stabilize industrial relations ....
Without some effective method of assuring freedom from economic warfare for the term of the agreement, there is little reason why an
employer would desire to sign such a contract.
Consequently, to encourage the making of agreements and to promote industrial
peace through faithful performance by the parties, collective agreements affecting interstate commerce should be enforceable in the Federal courts. Our amendment would
provide for suits by unions as legal entities and against unions as legal entities in the
Federal courts in disputes affecting commerce....is
The initial obstacle in enforcing the terms of a collective agreement against a union
which has breached its provisions is the difficulty of subjecting the union to process. The
great majority of labor unions are unincorporated associations. At common law voluntary
associations are not suable as such.... As a consequence the rule in most jurisdictions, in
the absence of statute, is that unincorporated labor unions cannot be sued in their common
name.... Accordingly, the difficulty or impossibility of enforcing the terms of a collective
agreement in a suit at law against a union arises from the fact that each individual member of the union must be named and made a party to the suit.
Some States have enacted statutes which subject unincorporated associations to the jurisdiction of law courts. These statutes are by no means uniform; some pertain to fraternal
societies, welfare organizations, associations doing business, etc., and in some States the
courts have excluded labor unions from their application.
In the Federal courts, whether an unincorporated union can be sued depends upon
the procedural rules of the State in which the action is brought. ...
The Norris-LaGuardia Act has insulated labor unions, in the field of injunctions,
against liability for breach of contract. It has been held by a Federal court that strikes,
picketing, or boycotting, when carried on in breach of a collective agreement, involve a
"labor dispute" under the act so as to make the activity not enjoinable without a showing
of the requirements which condition the issuance of an injunction under the act. . . .
A great number of States have enacted anti-injunction statutes modeled after the
Norris-LaGuardia Act....
There are no Federal laws giving either an employer or even the Government itself
IS The requirement that the "agreements" or the "disputes" affect commerce was not retained in the
final legislation, as will appear in reading Section 301, 29 U. S. C. A. §x85 (Supp. 1947).
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any right of action against a union for any breach of contract. Thus there is no "sub.
stantive right" to enforce, in order to make the union suable as such in Federal courts.
Even where unions are suable, the union funds may not be reached for payment of
damages and any judgments or decrees rendered against an association as an entity may
be unenforceable....
It is apparent that until all jurisdictions, and particularly the Federal Government,
authorize actions against labor unions as legal entities, there will not be the mutual
responsibility necessary to vitalize collective-bargaining agreements.1"
The proponents of the Act in the Senate suggest the necessity for the adoption of
Section 301 on the ground that the state courts are inadequate to meet the needs of
enforcing labor contracts because of the existence of rules of procedure in the state
laws which are deemed unsound. Therefore, they conclude, the federal courts
should enter this field of jurisdiction, previously the preserve of state courts, so that
rules of procedure which the Federal Government prefers may take effect in this
type of contract litigation. Thus the federal courts are made the instruments for
the correction of state procedural limitations.
If this is a proper interpretation of the intent of Congress in enacting Section 30,
it is relevant to ask the additional question, whether such an intent is consistent
with the purposes of the framers of the Constitution in establishing and defining the
functions of the federal courts.
IV
The only clause in the judicial article of the Constitution which might sustain
Section
the jurisdiction granted in Section 301 is the federal question clause2
301(a) specifically excludes diversity of citizenship as a necessary condition of jurisdiction. Ordiharily, of course, diversity would constitute a basis for jurisdiction
over labor contract cases between citizens of different states if all requirements concerning venue, jurisdictional amount, and process were complied with. The other
categories of jurisdiction contained in Section 2 of Article III clearly have no application to, and confer no authority for, the jurisdiction conferred in Section 301.
The words of those who participated in the drafting of the Constitution and in
establishing the federal judiciary as a part of the new government indicate that the
federal question jurisdiction conferred in Article III, Section 2, was intended to
make the federal judicial power "coextensive" with the legislative 21 And Chief
Justice Marshall indicated that the federal question jurisdiction of the federal courts
2
was limited only by the extent of the delegated powers given to the legislature
1
2 SE.
.

REP. No.

5o5,

8oth Cong., Ist Sess.

15-17

(1947).

"' "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution,
the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority . .
U. S. CoNsr., Art. 111, $2.
"'Forrester, The Nature of a "Federal Question," 16 TuLANE L. REv. 362, at 364-367 (1942).
" "With respect to its cognizance in all cases arising under the Constitution and the laws of the

United States, he says that, the laws of the United States being paramount to the laws of the particular
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That this was in the minds of the framers of the Constitution is indicated by the
fears expressed concerning the application of such a sweeping and inclusive grant of
judicial power to the national courts.2 3 James Madison, who appears to have been
responsible for the "arising under" phrase,24 did not deny the generous import of
the words; he referred to the judicial power as one which of necessity "should
correspond with the legislative."25
The basic consideration in the minds of the Federalists, in 1787, was the recognition and the fear of the power of interpretation in the hands of unsympathetic
and antagonistic state court judges?' It was their purpose to insure that federal
27 The record
laws should be construed by federal judges with federal sympathies.
of Chief Justice Marshall in the interpretation of federal laws over a period of three
decades reflects the wisdom and good judgment of this purpose, from the standpoint
of those favoring a strong central government. 28 The need for uiformity in the
states, there is no case but what this will extend to. Has the government of the United States power to
make laws on every subject? . . . Can they go beyond the delegated powers?" Statement of Johu
Marshall during the Virginia Convention on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, 3 ELuorr, DEATes
o, 553 (2d ed. 1836).
IN TE SEVERAL STATE CoNVENTIONS ON THE AsDOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CoNSTr
"Governor Randolph said: "Notwithstanding the contempt gentlemen express for technical terms,
I wish such were mentioned here. I would have thought it more safe, if it had been more clearly
expressed. What do we mean by the words arising under the Constitution? What do they relate
to? I conceive this to be very ambiguous. If my interpretation be right, the word aridng will
be carried so far that it will be made use of to aid and extend the federal jurisdiction." Id. at 572.
Mr. Grayson said: "My next objection to the federal judiciary is, that it is not expressed in a definite
manner. The jurisdiction of all cases arising under the Constitution and the laws of the Union is of
stupendous magnitude.
"It is impossible for human nature to trace its extent. It is so vaguely and indefinitely expressed, that
its latitude cannot be ascertained." Id. at 565.
Mr. George Mason said: "I am greatly mistaken if there be any limitation whatsoever, with respect
to the nature or jurisdiction of these courts. If there be any limits, they must be contained in one of
the clauses of this section; and I believe, on a dispassionate discussion, it will be found that there is
none of any check. All the laws of the United States are paramount to the laws and constitution of any
single state. 'The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution.' What objects will not this expression extend to? Such laws may be formed as will go to
every object of private property. . . . To what disgraceful and dangerous length does the principle of
this gol . . . To those who think that one national, consolidated government is best for America, this
extensive judicial authority will be agreeable; . . ." Id. at 521-522.
"On July i8, 1787, during the Constitutional Convention, Madison proposed: "'That the jurisdiction shall extend to all cases arising under the Nat. Laws: And to such other questions as may involve
the Nat. peace & harmony,' which was agreed to ner con." HUNT AND SCOTT, DEBATES IN THE FEaa.
CoNvENTIoN

OF 1787 279 (192o); see also MAx FAPRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION

OF 1787 39 (i9iI)"
"Madison said: "The first class of cases to which its jurisdiction extends are those which may arise
under the Constitution; . . . With respect to the laws of the Union, it is so necessary and expedient
that the judicial power should correspond with the legislative, that it has not been objected to." 3
ELorr, op. cit. supra, note 22, at 532.
whoever hath an absolutc authority to interpret
"Bishop Hoadly expressed it in this manner: "...
any written or spoken laws, it is he who is truly the Law-giver to all intents and purposes, and not the
person who first wrote or spoke them." Sermon (1717), quoted in J. C. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SoURcES
OF TE LAW 125 (2d ed. 1927)"The principles of Gestilt psychology are interesting and provocative in this connection.
an excellent study of the Supreme Court, and particularly the record of Chief Justice
'For
Marshall, see CHARLES G. HAINES, TH-E RoLE OF nTa SuPREuM CotwTr IN AMERICAN GovEN s&ENT"AsD
POLITICS, 1789-1835 (1944). A chart reflecting the course of Marshall's decisions is set forth on p.
611. It shows his record to be strongly nationalist.
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interpretation and application of federal laws was also a consideration of substantial
importance in giving the Federal Government its own judiciary.20
In matters where Congress has set up a broad legislative program and policy,
within one of the legislative powers delegated in the Constitution, it may be argued
that Congress is acting within the constitutional intent which has just been discussed
in granting jurisdiction to the federal courts over all litigation connected with and
forming a part of such a program. It may be said that this is true though the jurisdiction includes cases connected with the program which would otherwise be within
the jurisdiction of the state courts only. It may be said that cases involving only questions of fact, rather than the actual interpretation of federal law, should be within
the province of the federal courts on the ground that the federal program or policy
may be thwarted just as effectively and completely in such litigation as in that involving questions of law.30 The result of such an approach-and this appears to
be the approach reflected in the language of Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Actmay profoundly disturb those who fear the advance of federal power. For here is
an example of the potential blotting out of state judicial power on the same level as
that which the country has experienced in relation to the liberal and free interpretation of the federal legislative powers in such fields as commerce, taxing and spending, and the war power.3 '
But it may be said, on the other hand, that while the Constitution may bear the
construction which finds an intent to safeguard federal plans and legislative programs
through a friendly federal judiciary, it is going beyond the fair purport of the Constitution to permit the federal judicial system to be used as a means of indirect reform
and modification of the rules of procedure of the states. The ultimate answer may
possibly be found by inquiring whether the fundamental object in Section 301 isto
implement a federal plan for the regulation of labor-management relations under the
commerce power or to reform state rules of procedure in a single field-contract
litigation involving labor.
V
The intent, however, of the drafters of law is one thing; the actual interpretation
and application of the words of the law by the courts may be another. This proposition is particularly cogent in relation to federal question jurisdiction. But before
this point is applied to the subject under discussion it is necessary to review some
legal fundamentals.
Consider first the elementary proposition that the federal courts are courts of
limited jurisdiction in the same sense that the federal government is one of limited
21" Thirteen independent courts,' says a very celebrated statesman (and we have now more than
twenty such courts), ' of final jurisdiction over the same causes, erising upon the same laws, is a
hydra in government, from which nothing but contradiction and confusion can proceed.'" Cohcns v.
Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 415-46, (U. S. z82i).
O'See Forrester, Federal Question Jurisdiction and Section 5, x8 TULAn L. R.v. 263, at 287 (1943).
" IThe writer intends to offer no attitude one way or the other on this matter in this paper.
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powers. This is so because the federal government and its courts are authorized to
exercise only those powers conferred upon them in the Constitution. State governments and state courts, on the other hand, are of general and residual jurisdiction.
Consequently, in order to determine the powers of the federal courts one must
look to the language of the judicial article of the Constitution, Article III. If the
federal courts attempt to exercise a power which is not set forth therein the attempt
is unconstitutional. Not only must the power be contained in Article III; in addition, Congress must pass a statute authorizing the courts to exercise the jurisdiction 3 2
But if Congress passes a statute presuming to authorize the federal courts to
handle cases which are not within the terms of Article III the statute is unconstitutional.
In relation to the jurisdiction of the federal courts in labor matters, Congress, in
Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, has authorized jurisdiction so broad that it
must approach, if it does not exceed, the limits of Article III. For that reason, in
addition to its current interest, the Act affords a good basis for the theoretical consideration of the scope of federal jurisdiction in the field of labor law 3
Section 301(a) says:

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between
any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without
regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Clearly, the constitutionality of this broad grant of jurisdiction is based upon the
words ".

.

. in an industry affecting commerce . . ."

A reflection of the congressional intent in the use of these words is found in the
following statement from the report of the Committee of Conference on the bill:
Section 302 of the House bill and section 301 of the Senate amendment contained provisions relating to suits by and against labor organizations in the courts of the United
States. The conference agreement follows in general the provisions of the House bill
with changes therein hereafter noted.
Section 302(a) of the House bill provided that any action for or proceeding involving
a violation of a contract between an employer and a labor organization might be brought
by either party in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties,
without regard to the amount in controversy, if such contract affected commerce, or the
court otherwise had jurisdiction. Under the Senate amendment the jurisdictional test
was whether the employer was in an industry affecting commerce or whether the labor
organization represented employees in such an industry. This test contained in the Senate
" The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, expressly referred to in Article I1, is an exception
to this rule.
"Section 2x6(b) of the Fair Labor Stiandards Act, 52 STAT. io69 (1938), 29 U. S. C. §216(b)
(1940), also contains a generous provision for jurisdiction as it has been construed by the courts. See
note 7, supra. The language of the Taft-Hartley Act appears broader, however, and thus affords a better
basis for consideration of the fundamental problem. But the analysis of the cases in relation to the
extent of federal question jurisdiction in labor disputes, set forth hereinafter, is applicable, in general,
to the validity of the grant of jurisdiction in connection with Fair Labor Standards cases.
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amendment is also contained in the conference agreement, rather than the test in the
34
House bill which required that the "contract affect commerce."
Thus, whereas the House bill confined jurisdiction to those cases in which the
contract involved in the case actually affected commerce (or jurisdiction existed on
other, regular grounds), the bill as enacted sets up a much broader test by leaving
out the requirement that the particular contract affect commerce and by requiring
only that the industry affect commerce. It should also be noted that the congressional intent, as reflected by the above report, is that the jurisdictional requirement of
the statute is met if either (i)the industry in which the employer is engaged affects
commerce, or (z) the labor organization represents employees in an industry which
affects commerce.
Accordingly, it would appear that neither the employer, the employees, nor the
labor organization need affect, nor be engaged in, commerce to come within the
grant of jurisdiction, so long as there is involved an industry which affects commerce. Furthermore, it could be argued under the wording of the statute and report
that the particular employer and his employees need not be in an industry affecting
commerce, if the labor organization represents employees in some other plant which
is in an industry affecting commerce.
Additional questions are evident concerning the meaning and scope of the terms
"labor organization" and "industry affecting commerce." '
Is such a broad grant of jurisdiction by Congress to the federal courts within
the limitations of the federal question clause of Article III? Can it be said that the
general reference to "an industry affecting commerce" may justify the conclusion that
all litigation referred to in Section 301 concerning labor contracts involves suits " ...
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,

or which shall be made, under their authority;

. . ."?I

The answer to this question has been complicated by conflicting decisions of the
United States Supreme Court. There are, however, only a few basic cases which are
involved in the problem and which also form the basis for the confusion. Hundreds
of other cases have been decided concerning the interpretation and meaning of the
words "arising under,"3' but they simply repeat and frequently cite the basic decisions!'
" H. R. REP. No. 510, 8oth Cong., 1st Sess. 65-66 (1947).
-BSee 5o1(3), 29 U. S. C. A. §I42(c) (Supp. 1947).
"See S5o(i), 29 U. S. C. A. S542(a)

(Supp. 1947).

"7
8 U. S. Cousr., Art. III, S2(i).
sFor
a study of these cases, see Chadbourn and Levin, Origin d furisdiion of Federal Questiot,
90 U. OF PA. L. REv. 639 (1942); Forrester, The Nature of a "Federal Question," 16 TULANE L. REY.
362 (942); Forrester, Federal Question lurisdicdon and Section 5, 18 TuLANE L. Ray. 263 (1943).
The case of Re Metropolitan Railway Receivership, 2o8 U. S. go (igo8), has been cited in two
Olverson, Collecdt'e Bargaining
instances to support the argument that S30(a) is unconstitutional.
and the Taft-Hartley Labor Act, 33 VA. L. Rav. 549, 578 (1947); H. R. REP. No. 245, 8oth Cong.,
ist Sess. 109-1o (1947). This case follows and is based upon Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes,
the case
96 U. S. 599 (1877), which isone of the basic cases referred to. The Metropolitan case cites
of Defiance Water Co. v. Defiance, igs U. S. 184 (1903) for its rule and the Defiance case cites and is
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The basic and leading case defining the scope of the "arising under" (federal
question) clause in the Constitution is the Osborn case of 1824, in which Chief
Justice Marshall wrote the opinion.40 It was an opinion in which Marshall played
to the full his role as a Federalist judge interested in sustaining and enlarging the
power of the Federal Government-in this instance, the federal judicial power.
While the decision is so lengthy that it exhausts the student who seriously attempts to analyze it, and has portions which appear to be contradictory-so contradictory, in fact, that they have been quoted separately in subsequent cases to reach
contrary results-it holds, in effect, that if Congress has the constitutional power
to pass a law creating legal rights, the federal courts can be given jurisdiction by
Congress to handle all litigation arising by reason thereof.
The Osborn case not only constitutes the leading exposition of the meaning
of the constitutional clause, but also serves to illustrate its application in an actual
problem.
Congress enacted a law issuing a charter to the Bank of the United States and
giving the federal courts jurisdiction of all suits involving the bank. No distinction
was made between suits involving the meaning and interpretation of the law establishing the bank and suits involving issues of fact concerning only the customary
and ordinary business of the bank. Marshall considered whether such a broad grant
of jurisdiction was within the federal question clause of the Constitution.
First he observed that:
The executive department may constitutionally execute every law which the legislature
may constitutionally make, and the judicial department may receive from the legislature
the power of construing every such law.41
This clause enables the judicial department to receive jurisdiction to the full extent
of the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, when any question respecting
42

them shall assume such a form that the judicial power is capable of acting on it.

What he meant by the word "construing" and the later words, "a form that
the judicial power is capable of acting on," is demonstrated by the remainder of the
opinion.
He said that since the bank had been chartered by an act of Congress, it "can
based upon the Gold-Washing case, which will be referred to specifically later herein. The language of
the Metropolitan case which is referred to in support of the argument that §30(a) isunconstitutional
is found at page xog of the opinion: "A case under the Constitution or laws of the United States does
not arise against a railroad engaged in interstate commerce from that mere fact. Itonly arises under
the Constitution, or laws or treaties of the United States, when it substantially involves a controversy as
to the effect or construction of the Constitution or on the determination of which the result depends."
As will be noted later, this language referred to the words "arising under" as used in a statute, rather
than as used in Article III of the Constitution.
'Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738 (U. S. 1824).
"Id.

at

SB.

"7Id. at 89.
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acquire no right, make no contract, bring no suit, which is not authorized by a law
of the United States.... Can a being, thus constituted, have a case which does not
arise literally, as well as substantially, under the law?"43
When a bank sues [he continued], the first question which presents itself, and which
lies at the foundation of the cause is, has this legal entity a right to sue? Has it a right
to come, not into this court particularly, but into any court? This depends on a law of the
United States. . .. 4' The right to sue, if decided once, is decided forever; but the power
of Congress was exercised antecedently to the first decision on that right, and if it was
constitutional then, it cannot cease to be so, because the particular question is decided....
The question forms an original ingredient in every cause. Whether it be in fact relied on
or not, in the defense, it is still a part of the cause, and may be relied on.4 5
The clause in the patent law, authorizing suits in the circuit courts, stands, we think,
on the same principle. Such a suit is a case arising under a law of the United States.
Yet the defendant may not, at the trial, question the validity of the patent, or make any
point which requires the construction of an act of Congress. He may rest his defense exclusively on the fact that he has not violated the right of the plaintiff. That this fact
becomes the sole question made in the cause, cannot oust the jurisdiction of the court, or
40
establish the position, that the case does not arise under a law of the United States.
Every act of the bank grows out of this law, and is tested by it. To use the language of
47
the Constitution, every act of the bank arises out of this law.
Under the Osborn case, it would appear that if Congress, by legislative act,
chartered an employer or a labor organization it would clearly have the constitutional
authority to give the federal courts jurisdiction over all cases, including labor contract disputes, involving the employer or the labor organization.
But the jurisdiction granted in Section 301 is more inclusive. Employers and
labor organizations existing entirely apart from any federal charter are covered.
Section 301 bases its constitutionality on the commerce clause, rather than a
federal charter.48 And so it raises a question which goes beyond the scope of the
Osborn case-whether Congress can give the federal courts jurisdiction over litigation which is ordinarily within state court jurisdiction, merely on the ground that
the employer or the labor organization involved in the litigation is in an industry
which affects commerce. It has already been noted that the employer need not affect
commerce, the labor organization need not affect commerce, the particular contract
or dispute need not affect commerce. It is only required that the industry of either
the employer or the labor organization affect commerce. While the suggestion that
the commerce power is so pervasive may not be novel where the power of the legislature is concerned, its full implications concerning the scope of the federal judicial
power are most interesting, to say the least.
"Id. at 823.
"'Id.at 826.

"Id. at 824.

"Id. at 823-824.
'Id. at

827.

"In McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 18i9), the Court held that the Federal Government had the power to establish a bank as an incidental power, necessary and proper to carry into
execution expressly delegated powers, such as the fiscal power and the taxing and spending powers.
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Serious doubt was expressed in the House and the Senate concerning the constitutionality of such a broad grant of jurisdiction 4 9 Indeed, the original apprehensions
expressed at the time of the adoption of the Constitution concerning the potential
application of the words "arising under" seem to be justified by this new law °
Nevertheless, those apprehensions to some degree sustain, rather than argue against,
the constitutionality of Section 301(a). No positive denial is to be found in response
to these fears concerning the breadth of the clause. Silence in rebuttal, evident in
Madison's Notes covering the proceedings and debates in the Philadelphia convention, and in the Federalist papers and other sources, would seem to suggest that
perhaps the clause does have such wide scope. If so, the potential extent of federal
judicial power seems no more limited than the potential extent of the legislative
power under the broad areas of the commerce clause, the war power, the power to
tax and spend for the general welfare, and the other sweeping and growing sources
of power in the Federal Government.
VII
But the words "arising under" have not always been given the broad meaning
attributed to them in the Osborn case.
In the Act of March 3, 1875, Congress provided:
That the circuit courts of the United States shall have original cognizance . . .-of all
suits... arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States....
Except for the abortive Act of February 13, 18oi,2 passed by the Federalists,
which was repealed in the next year, 53 Congress had not, prior to 1875, given the
lower federal courts jurisdiction over federal question cases, except in special instances such as the grant of jurisdiction for the bank considered in the Osborn case.
The words of the Act of March 3, 1875, and the words of Article III are substantially identical. The words "arising under" are used in both to describe the grant
of federal question jurisdiction. It would seem that the conclusion should be that
Congress intended to bestow all the federal question jurisdiction of Article III on the
federal trial courts.9 4 One would certainly be inclined to assume that the same
words have the same meaning.
In fact, Senator Matthew H. Carpenter, the draftsman of the Act, said:
The Constitution says that certain judicial powers shall be conferred upon the United5
States. The Supreme Court of the United States in an opinion delivered by Judge Story
said that itisthe duty of the Congress of the United States to vest all the judicial
power of the Union in some Federal court, and if they may withhold a part of it they
...

"'See note 23 supra.
12 supra.
REv. STAT. S§563, 629 (x873); 34 S-t.- 1091 (91.), as amended, 28 U. S. C. §41(x) (1940).

' See note
11

922 STAT. 89, 92 (18o).

gs-2STAT. 132 (1o,).

by Chadbourn and Levin, cited supra, note 38, in which they give §5 of the Act
r' Cl. the article
of March 3, x875, a restrictive role in connection with the application of the "arising under" clause of
the statute. A different view was taken by this writer in the articles referred to in the same note.
Carpenter was referring to Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, i Wheat. 304, 330 (U. S. x816).
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may withhold all of it and defeat the Constitution by refusing or simply omitting to
carry its provisions into execution.
The Act of 1789 did not confer the whole power which the Constitution conferred; it did
not do what the Supreme Court has said Congress ought to do; it did not perform what
the Supreme Court has declared to be the duty of Congress. This bill does.
This bill gives precisely the power which the Constitution confers-nothing more, nothing less.5
But in assuming that the repetition in the statute of the words of Article III
would have the effect of giving "precisely the power which the Constitution confers,"
Senator Carpenter failed to reckon with the power of statutory interpretation possessed by the courts, whereby words come to mean what the courts want them to
mean.

57

For despite the identity of the language of the statute with that of the Constitution, as well as this emphatic expression of intent in Congress, the federal courts
reached a result which substantially limited the meaning of "arising under," at
least as used in the statute r
In the first Supreme Court case which actually gave consideration to the new law
the Court said:
In the language of Chief Justice Marshall, a case "may truly be said to arise under the
Constitution or a law of the United States whenever its correct decision depends upon the
construction of either" (Cohens v. Virginia .. .); or when "the title or right set up by
the party may be defeated by one construction of the Constitution or law of the United
States, or sustained by the opposite construction" (Osborn v. Bank of the United States
. . .). A cause cannot be removed from a State court simply because, in the progress of
the litigation, it may become necessary to give a construction to the Constitution or laws
of the United States. The decision of the case must depend upon that construction. The
suit must, in part at least, arise out of a controversy between the parties in regard to the
operation and effect of the Constitution or laws upon the facts involved.,5
It is particularly interesting to note that the court cited the Osborn case-incorrectly and by lifting out of context a portion of the opinion which can only be
understood by reading the entire opinion-as authority for an interpretation of the
meaning of "arising under" which is much more narrow than the interpretation
given the words by the Osborn decision, if the opinion is read as a whole.
The leading modern case on the matter is Gully v. First National Bank,0o in
which Mr. Justice Cardozo wrote the opinion. The case concerned the power of
the State of Mississippi to tax the shares of a national bank. Federal jurisdiction
RPc., Pt. 5, 4986-4987 (1874)"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master-that's all." LEwis CARROLL, THROUoH
2 CONG.

im LooKING
GLAss.
1

s This result, in which the Supreme Court proved Bishop Hoadly as well as Humpty Dumpty to be
right, was brought about, as a practical matter, by the desire of the federal courts to hold down the
amount of litigation chming to them.
" Gold-Washing &!Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199, at 201, 203 (1877).
to299 U. S. 109 (1936).
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was sought on the ground that the case was one "arising under" federal law because
a federal statute was allegedly involved which permitted states to tax national banks
provided certain conditions were complied with. The Court held that there was no
federal question in the case, and Cardozo said:
How and when a case arises "under the Constitution or laws of the United States" has
been much considered in the books....

Looking backward we can see that the early cases were less exacting than the recent
ones in respect of some of these conditions. If a federal right was pleaded, the question
was not always asked whether it was likely to be disputed. This is seen particularly in
suits by or against a corporation deriving its charter from an act of Congress. [Citing
the Osborn case] . . . "A suit to enforce a right which takes its origin in the laws of the

United States is not necessarily, or for that reason alone, one arising under those laws, for a
suit does not so arise unless it really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy
respecting the validity, construction or effect of such a law, upon the determination of
which the result depends." 61
Cardozo makes no effort here to distinguish between the constitutional phrase
"arising under" and the statutory one. By his reference to the Osborn case, he
challenges the validity of giving them different meanings and indicates that both
have the narrow meaning which he describes.0 2 Note the statement that "the early
cases were less exacting than the recent ones," and his citation of the Osborn case
as an illustration.
If the implication of Cardozo's statements concerning the Osborn case is that
the Supreme Court will no longer recognize a difference between the constitutional
phrase and the statutory one, and that both of them have the narrow meaning set
forth so clearly and without qualification in the Gully case, the simple conclusion is
that Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act and similar grants of federal jurisdiction are
unconstitutional.
This is true because labor contract cases do not ordinarily involve a dispute or
controversy respecting the validity, construction, or effect of federal law upon the
determination of which the result depends. And obviously the mere fact that
"an industry affecting commerce" is connected, perhaps indirectly, with the case
would not meet Cardozo's test. For it is evident that the mere fact that the employer or the labor organization ma- be in an industry affecting commerce would
not require a construction of federal law in a particular case upon which the result
would depend. Usually such cases involve questions of fact or questions of contract interpretation without any disputed issue concerning interstate commerce or
federal law.
It would seem that, in order to sustain the constitutionality of Section 301, the
Supreme Court will be forced to qualify the language of Cardozo in the Gully case
in so far as it relates to the Constitution and the rule of the Osborn case. The "early
61299 U. S. 109, Ili-'14 (1936).

'2It is interesting. to note that the rule of the Gully case is taken from the Gold-Washing decision,
which in turn cited the O;born cise for its authoity, which in turn is criticized in the Gully "pinion.
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cases" must continue "less exacting"--particularly in the definition of "arising under"
in the Constitution-or Section 301 is unconstitutional. And, of even more importance, the jurisdiction of the federal courts in such matters as patent, bankruptcy,
and Fair Labor Standards Act cases is invalid-as now interpreted.ps
The issue presented in connection with Section 301 may force the Supreme Court
to perform the long delayed task of clarifying the contradiction between the definitions of the words "arising under" in the statute and in the Constitution.
In view of the identity of the words it is clear that the court cannot accomplish
this result in any sensible manner upon the basis of previous decisions. A reconsideration of the entire federal question field would appear necessary if the court is to
clarify the present judicial disorder. The solution proposed by Messrs. Chadbourn
and Levin, based upon their interpretation of Section 5 of the Act of x875, would be
4
workable, but its validity on the basis of congressional intent has been questioned.
A far more satisfactory and proper solution, of course, would be reached if Congress should rewrite, knowingly and systematically, its statutes conferring federal
question jurisdiction. This can be accomplished by enacting statutes expressly and
intentionally limiting the number of cases coming into the federal courts by some
orderly device, such as the one claimed for Section 5 by Messrs. Chadbourn and
Levin, while recognizing the necessity for the broad meaning of the "arising under"
clause in the Constitution, established by the Osborn decision.
, VIII
Even under such a program, however, the constitutionality of a grant of jurisdiction such as that contained in Section 301 would be doubtful. Under either the
definition of the Osborn case or that of the Gully case, the validity of the section
is subject to question. If the narrow definition of "arising under" set forth in the
Gully case should be applied by the Supreme Court to the constitutional phraseand Cardozo made no distinction-Section 301 is unconstitutional for the reasons
previously presented.
If, on the other hand, Cardozo's remarks casting doubt upon the breadth of the
constitutional phrase as defined in the Osborn case are ignored-as the writer believes they should be-the ultimate question remains whether even the generous
definition of the Osborn case is sufficiently broad to sustain the grant of jurisdiction
contained in Section 301. For even under that definition, there is still the problem
of whether it is constitutional to grant jurisdiction over ordinary contract cases
involving labor, merely because one of the parties to the contract is in an "industry
affecting commerce."
It is important to note again the following words in the Osborn opinion:
...it is said that the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of every well con.
" The federal courts often handle litigation in these fields which involves only issues of fact with no
dispute whatever concerning the law.
"Forrester, Federal. Question lurisdiction and Secton 5, 18 TuLANE L. REv. 263 (1943).
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structed government are co-extensive with each other; that is, they are potentially co-

extensive. The executive department may constitutionally execute every law which the
Legislature may constitutionally make, and the judicial department may receive from the
65
Legislature the power of construing every such law. ....
This clause enables the judicial department to receive jurisdiction to the full extent

of the constitution, laws and treaties of the United States, when any question respecting
6.
them shall assume such a form that the judicial power is capable of acting on it. ....
"The power of construing . . . any question respecting" federal law is applied

in the Osborn case to mean that the courts may be given jurisdiction to handle any

case, whether ordinarily within state court jurisdiction or not, and including contract cases comparable to those involved in Section 301, if an act of Congress-a valid
federal law-creates an entity or organization which is a party to the case. Such an
entity "can acquire no right, make no contract, bring no suit, which is not authorized
by a law of the United States.":
But does the jurisdiction granted in Section 301 come within this rule, for all its
liberality?
Ordinarily, of course, neither an employer nor a labor organization would be
created by federal law, as was the bank.
But can it be said that Congress, by creating, through a federal law, a federal plan
of control of labor matters, has created an entity which may be compared, by analogy,
with the bank?
An affirmative answer to this question would appear to be the crux of any
argument seeking to sustain the constitutionality of Section 301.
One may argue in support of such a view that the federal plan-the entity-is
based validly upon the commerce power of the federal legislature in the same manner and with the same force that the bank-the entity-was based validly upon
the fiscal power of the federal legislature."8 Both, the proponent may claim, owe
their existence to, and are authorized by, a law of the United States.
It may be argued that as a matter of constitutional policy there is no stronger
reason for permitting Congress, in its discretion, to give jurisdiction to the federal
courts over all cases involving a bank created by it than for permitting it to give
jurisdiction over all litigation involving a federal plan or program which it has
established. In both instances it may be said with justification that Congress
should be possessed of the power to see that uniform and impartial judicial treatment is given the litigation (factual or legal) which may involve either. The observation has already been made that there is good reason, from the federal standpoint, for insisting upon the trial of issues of fact in a sympathetic and unified
'9 Wheat. 738, 8W8 (U. S. 1824). (Italics supplied.)
"Id. at 81g. (Italics supplied.)
e Id. at 823. (Italics supplied.)
See note 48 supra. The implications of the McCudloch case in this connection are substantial
and call for study beyond the scope of this paper. The writer can only suggest the relevance of this
case herein.
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judicial system just as there is good reason for insisting upon the trial of issues of
law in such courts. Potentially, at least, state courts can abuse their jurisdiction and
create lack of uniformity in the trial of issues of fact and simple issues of contract
law in connection with a federal plan for the regulation of labor-management relations just as they could in matters involving a federal bank-a part of a federal plan
for the regulation of fiscal affairs.
True enough, under such an interpretation Congress could, if it should take
full advantage of it, completely swamp the federal judges with litigation-far more
than their present number and the present structure of the federal judicial system
would bear. But broad power must rest somewhere in every system of government,
and the potential abuse of the necessary power of government is no argument against
its existence.69 Perhaps we must trust, in this as in many other areas of governmental action, that the legislature will not abuse the power but will exercise it
prudently within its discretion.

It is also worthy of note that, if the legislature goes too far, the courts may protect
themselves through their power of statutory interpretation. The federal courts
faced such a problem in connection with the Act of March 3, 1875, and solved it,
even though in a clumsy way, by the Gold-Washing decision, which drastically
reduced the number of cases Senator Carpenter intended they should receive. It is
possible that the federal judiciary may give such a performance again in connection with Section 301, particularly if the practical effect of the section is to bring
a flood of cases into the courts.
However, there is no certainty that the federal courts will object to being given
this power over labor disputes, even though it may mean a substantial increase in
their business. To the contrary, some federal judges have complained about the
growth of the power of judging in administrative agencies. But it is significant that
if the present grant of power over labor matters is held constitutional, the power will
have been clearly established in Congress to grant broad jurisdiction over many other
fields, unrelated to labor, which the federal courts might neither desire nor be able
to handle within their present structure.
In opposition to the the constitutionality of Section 301 one may insist upon an
application of the words in the Osborn case in a manner more narrow than that
indicated in support of the grant. Reduced to a matter of policy, as are so many
questions of constitutionality where the courts play the role of Humpty Dumpty
and make words mean what they want them to mean, the objections to Section 301
are substantial.
The effect of construing Article III to sustain the constitutionality of Section
301 would seem to be to make the judicial power completely coextensive with the
60 "It is always a doubtful course to argue against the use or existence of a power, from the possibility
of its abuse. . . . From the very nature of things, the absolute right of decision, in the last resort, must
rest somewhere-wherever it may be vested it is susceptible of abuse." From the opinion of Mr. Justice
Story in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, i Wheat. 304, 344-345 (U. S. z86).
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legislative power. Whereupon, one must recognize the possibility-even though
it may be a remote one-that the federal government could move into and blot
out much of state judicial power as it now exists. This will suggest hesitation at
least to those who view with alarm the growth of federal legislative power from
such broad sources as the commerce, taxing and spending, and war powers. Indeed,
the very Congress which passed Section 301 has claimed for itself the protective role
of preventing such expansion, at least in the field of legislation.
This contradiction suggests that all factions are willing to countenance the concentration of power in the federal government when it serves the objects they desire.

